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Oil on troubled waters: Multi-
national corporations and realising 
human rights in the developing 
world,	with	specific	reference	to	
Nigeria
Hakeem O Yusuf*
Tutor and Doctoral Candidate, School of Law, University of Glasgow, United 
Kingdom
It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, 
to rebellion against oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law.1
It is like paradise and hell. They have everything. We have nothing … if we 
complain they send soldiers.2
Summary
This article examines the current state of tension in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria. It locates the current unrest in the continued denial of economic, 
social and cultural rights to the oil-rich communities in the area. The author 
argues that this denial happened with the complicity and acquiescence of 
the international community. The Nigerian government as well as multi-
national corporations operating in the area have not been responsive to 
the development needs of the people. The article argues that, although the 
primary obligation for realising the economic, social and cultural rights of 
* LLB (Hons) (Lagos), LLM (Ulster), Barrister and Solicitor (Supreme Court of Nigeria); 
h.yusuf.1@research.gla.ac.uk. I am grateful to Prof Mashood Baderin for his useful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also express appreciation to the peer 
reviewers of the African Human Rights Law Journal for their valuable comments. The 
usual caveats apply.
1 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 UN GA 
Res 217 A (III), UN Doc A/810 71 (1948).
2 Eghare Ojiogor, Chief of the Ugborodo community, an oil-rich area in Delta State, 
Nigeria, quoted in Amnesty International ‘Claiming rights and resources: Injustice, 
oil and violence in Nigeria’ http://web.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR44/020/2005 
(accessed 12 January 2007).
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host communities rests on the government, multi-national corporations in 
developing countries, considering their awesome resources and influence 
on government policies, should be similarly obligated to respect, promote 
and protect those rights.
1 Introduction
Successive Nigerian governments have continually denied the people 
of the oil-rich Niger Delta area of the country their economic, social 
and cultural rights, and, by extension, their right to development. This 
has led to social restiveness, and lately, the agitation of varying colou-
rations in the area. The social discontent manifests itself in paramilitary 
criminality, hostage taking, the sabotage of oil installations and car 
bombings in the area.3
This has resulted in substantial economic losses for the major 
beneficiaries of oil exploration in Nigeria: the Nigerian state and the 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) operating in Nigeria. The latter 
include Shell Petroleum Development Company (Shell), Texaco, Total, 
Exxon-Mobil and Chevron. The impact is felt globally in high oil prices: 
Tensions in the Niger Delta have been identified as one of the factors 
responsible for the rise in international oil prices. When the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the most organised 
and militant group to emerge in the area, attacked some of Shell’s 
installations on 16 January 2006, there was a $1 per barrel rise in world 
oil prices the next day.4 The situation resulted in the loss of over $4,45b 
to the Nigerian government in 2006 alone.5
The people of the Niger Delta complain about environmental deg-
radation resulting from oil exploration activities in the area, social 
deprivation and a lack of jobs. They have to contend with political 
marginalisation in the Nigerian polity and a dearth of infrastructures in 
their area. This is despite the fact that oil from the area accounts for a 
major share of the country’s total revenue.
In Nigeria, economic, social and cultural rights do not form part 
of the constitutional Bill of Rights. They are provided for only as non-
justiciable ‘fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy’. 6 Economic, social and cultural rights are dispersed in the 
various provisions of sections 14 to 18 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
3 International Crisis Group Swamps of insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta unrest (Africa Report 
115 2006) http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4310 (accessed 7 Janu-
ary 2007).
4 International Crisis Group Fuelling the Niger Delta crisis Africa Report 118 (28 Sep-
tember 2006) 6 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4394 (accessed 
7 January 2007).
5 E Amaefule ‘Nigeria loses N570b to Niger-Delta crisis’ The Punch 9 January 2007.
6 Ch II Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
The country has, however, ratified the International Covenant on Social 
and Economic Rights (CESCR).7
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)8 
guarantees economic, social and cultural rights and peoples’ rights 
alongside civil and political rights. Nigeria ratified the treaty early on. 
The African Charter has, in accordance with the country’s constitutional 
practice, been enacted (without amendment) as municipal legislation 
and incorporated into domestic law as far back as 1983.9 It is also sig-
nificant to note that, in spite of the non-justiciable status of economic, 
social and cultural rights under the Nigerian Constitution, the country 
has not entered a reservation, declaration or objection to any of the 
provisions of CESCR.
Nigeria as a state is a subject of international law. It may be argued 
that MNCs and the local communities are also ‘subjects’ of interna-
tional law. This article proposes that international human rights law, in 
particular, provides a working template for achieving desired positive 
ends in the relationship of the state, the local communities and the 
MNCs through the institutionalisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights with the active participation of MNCs. Repressive measures can 
only exacerbate the volatile situation in the Niger Delta with serious 
consequences, not only for Nigeria and the MNCs, but for the interna-
tional community as well. There is a threat of civil war in the region. The 
refugee problem this portends can be dire, granted that official 2006 
provisional census figures put the country’s population at over 140 mil-
lion.10 Even now, the country exports millions of economic migrants 
to various parts of Africa, Europe and the United States. A foreboding 
of conflict alone is capable of flooding not only Africa, but other parts 
of the world with refugees.11 This is concomitant of an increasingly 
globalised world; political, social or economic action at a local level 
may sometimes impact on geographically far-flung locations.12
After part 1, the introduction, part two examines the current situation 
of restiveness in the oil-producing Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It situ-
ates this situation within the context of the historical, social, economic, 
7 Nigeria submitted its ratification to the UN on 29 July 1993 and it entered into force 
in the country on 29 October 1993.
8 Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev 5, (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 58. Nigeria signed it on 31 August 
1982 and ratified it in July 1983.
9 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement Act) ch 
A9 Vol 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
10 BBC News ‘Population in Nigeria tops 140m’ 29 December 2006 http://news.bbc.
co.uk/ 1/hi/world/africa/6217719.stm (accessed 29 December 2006).
11 International Crisis Group Want in the midst of plenty Africa Report 113 19 July 2006 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=44274 (accessed 8 January 2007).
12 D Held ‘Democratic accountability and political effectiveness from a cosmopolitan 
perspective’ (2004) 39 Government and Opposition 365-366.
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political and legal regimes of the largest black nation in the world. This 
is to highlight how the ongoing conflict has developed.
Part three analyses the significance of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) decision on the 
economic, social and cultural rights of the Ogoni community of the 
Niger Delta, in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and 
Another v Nigeria (SERAC case).13 Part four focuses on the obligations 
of MNCs under international human rights law. It advances the Privity 
Theory as a legal basis for enforcing a sustainable obligation on MNCs 
for realising the economic, social and cultural rights of their host com-
munities. Part five makes a case that the international community has 
been complicit in the denial of economic, social and cultural rights to 
the people of the Niger Delta.
2	 Antecedents	of	the	conflict
Oil, first drilled in 1956 at Oloibiri, a small community in the Niger 
Delta area of Nigeria, is at the centre of the current debacle. Nigeria, 
bolstered by soaring oil prices in the late 1960s and early 1970s, quickly 
shifted emphasis in its economy from agriculture to crude oil produc-
tion. Oil currently accounts for over 90% of the country’s total revenue. 
Nigeria’s 35,9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves ensures its place as 
the largest producer of oil in Africa.14
Despite its enormous oil wealth, most communities in the Niger Delta 
are in a sorry state. Their problems include large-scale environmental 
degradation,15 a lack of basic infrastructure and poor or non-existent 
social amenities. The unemployment rate of the youth is high, partly 
from poor education and a lack of skills. Life is literally ‘hard’ in the 
area.
The advent of democracy in Nigeria has witnessed repeated expres-
sions of frustration by the local communities in the Niger Delta area. 
There has been ‘a wave of attacks’16 on oil installations in the Niger 
Delta. Virtually all the multi-national oil exploration companies have 
had to scale back their production and in some cases they had to declare 
an inability to guarantee the fulfilment of their existing contractual 
13 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
14 Energy Information Administration Country analysis briefs: Nigeria 1 http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeul/cabs/ Nigeria/Oil/html (accessed 12 June 2006).
15 n 14 above, 2.
16 BBC News ‘Nigeria’s shadowy oil rebels’ 20 April 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/africa/ 4732210.stm (accessed 13 February 2006).
obligations.17 The continued tensions in the Nigeria Delta have earned 
the country the status of one in current or potential conflict.18
Shell has the largest operations in the Nigerian oil industry. A recent 
report commissioned by Shell declared that the level of conflict in the 
area was akin to that in Colombia and Chechnya.19 While this may be 
an overstatement, it is a pointer to the state of near crisis existing in the 
Niger Delta.
2.1 A restive delta: Agitations for self-determination
The Ogoni Bill of Rights (Bill) was ‘presented to the government and 
people of Nigeria’ in November 1990. This was in the days of military 
dictatorship in the country. The Bill advanced by the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) is indicative of the demands and 
agitations of the peoples of the Niger Delta. The Ogoni, while affirming 
their wish to remain a part of Nigeria, demand ‘political autonomy’ 
to participate in the affairs of the country as a ‘distinct and separate 
entity’ along with a right to the control of a ‘fair proportion’ of their 
resources for their development.
The Bill also demands the right to protect their environment and 
ecology from further degradation as well as the full development of the 
Ogoni language and culture. They demand an end to gas flaring and 
the payment of $10 billion in royalties from oil produced in Ogoniland 
since 1958 and in compensation for environmental degradation suf-
fered as a result.20
However, if the Ogoni struggle was the first to receive international 
attention in the context of the struggle for community-based control 
of the country’s oil resources, it has been overshadowed in recent times 
by that of the Ijaw. In the Kaiama Declaration, issued in 1998, the Ijaw 
declared their resolve to cease recognition of all21
undemocratic Nigerian state legislations such as the Land Use Decree, 1978 
and the Petroleum Decrees of 1969 and 1991, the Lands (Title Vesting, etc) 
Decree No 52 of 1993 (Osborne Land Decree), the National Inland Water-
ways Authority Decree No 13 of 1997, etc.
In essence, the Ijaw ‘repealed’ all the legislations they deemed to facili-
tate the vesting of the land and natural resources, namely oil and gas, 
on the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is now a matter of public record 
17 Human Rights Watch ‘The Niger Delta: No democratic dividend’ http://www.hrw.
org/ reports/2002/nigeria3/nigerdelta.pdf (accessed 10 September 2006).
18 Crisis Watch 41 2 January 2006 4 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/
crisiswatch/ cw_2007/cw41.doc (accessed 10 January 2007).
19 BBC News ‘Nigerian oil fuels Delta conflict’ 25 January 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/africa/4617658.stm (accessed 10 January 2007).
20 Ogoni Bill of Rights http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.
html (accessed 6 January 2007).
21 Kaiama Declaration (11 December 1988) http://ijawcenter.com/kaiama_declaration.
html (accessed 9 February 2008).
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that militants in the name of the Ijaw cause have engaged the Nige-
rian state and MNCs in the Niger Delta (home of the Ijaws and sundry 
ethnic groups) in an ongoing violent conflict. A number of palliative 
measures, including the zoning by the Vice-Presidency of the ruling 
party in the 2007 general elections, the historic appointment of an Ijaw 
as the Chief of Army and another as the Inspector-General of Police, 
have so far been unsuccessfully employed to assuage their feelings of 
neglect and exclusion from the mainstream of power in the country.
2.2 Position of the multi-national corporations
The attitude of Shell to the Ogoni Bill of Rights typifies the response of 
MNCs in the Niger Delta. Shell maintains that these demands are ‘clearly 
political’ as well as ‘constitutional’ and thus ‘outside the influence’ and 
‘jurisdiction of a private oil company’.22 It also ‘completely rejects all 
accusations of the abuse of human rights’. This culture of denial is at 
the heart of the present conflict in the Niger Delta. The escapist stance 
is typical of the response of MNCs to the realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights of the communities they operate in, particularly in 
developing countries. To cite but one example, following the 3 Decem-
ber 1984 Bhopal incident, which has been referred to as the ‘world’s 
worst industrial disaster’,23 Union Carbide Industries maintained the 
incident which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives24 (thousands 
are reportedly still dying or suffering debilitating health conditions in 
the aftermath)25 was due to sabotage rather than its own negligence.26 
This was in spite of the fact that the company had reportedly ignored 
several warnings on the danger its manufacturing operations posed to 
the local population.
Shell insists that it has made its largest ‘social investment’ in the area 
compared to all others in which it operates. As far as it is concerned, 
the fuss being made around the issue of ‘environmental devastation’ 
22 Shell Nigeria Press Release ‘Shell’s submission’ (to the Oputa Panel sitting in Port 
Harcourt Rivers State, Nigeria 23 January 2001) 3 http://www.shell.com/home/con-
tent/nigeria/news_and_library/press_releases/2001/2001_2301_01031504.html 
(accessed 11 September 2006).
23 Green Peace has led an over two decades-old campaign for justice for victims of 
the incident. See eg Green Peace Bhopal The world’s worst industrial disaster http://
www.greenpeace.org/international/footer/search?q=worst+industrial+disaster 
(accessed 13 September 2006). For a detailed analysis of the incident, see I Eckerman 
The Bhopal saga - Causes and consequences of the world’s largest industrial disaster 
(2004).
24 Union Carbide admits 3 800 died, but twice and even much higher figures (as much 
as 10 000) have been cited by independent observers, eg, Amnesty International 
puts the figure at 7 000. See Clouds of injustice- Bhopal 20 years on http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA20/01512004 (accessed 13 September 2006).
25 R Dhara & R Dhara ‘The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: A review of health effects’ 
(2002) 57 Archives of Environmental Health 391. 
26 Bhopal Information Centre Statement of Union Carbide Corporation regarding the 
Bhopal tragedy http://www.bhopal.com/ucs.htm (accessed 13 September 2006).
is a deliberate attempt to ‘attract attention to justifiable development 
needs of the Niger Delta’.27 The company’s position hinges on the 
concept of corporate social responsibility, largely based on the nor-
mative perspective of positive voluntary action, and finds support in 
some quarters. The weakness associated with it has been traced not 
to the normative basis but the exclusion of the local communities in 
the implementation of the model as a development initiative.28 But the 
foregoing statement clearly constitutes an implicit admission of the 
deprivation of the people in the area, despite supposed ‘huge social 
investment’ of the company. It leaves a question mark on the validity of 
such claims. More importantly, it acknowledges the right of the peoples 
of the Niger Delta to economic, social and cultural rights, including 
the right to development. Despite ongoing contestations, there is now 
international affirmation of the right to development.29
2.3 Political and legal framework
The Nigerian state, as represented by the federal authorities, who 
control the nation’s natural resources, has exhibited mixed reaction to 
the situation. It hovers between repression and pacification. Succes-
sive military regimes receive the greatest blame for the current state 
of under-development and violent conflict in the Niger Delta. In 1994, 
the military ruler, General Sanni Abacha, ordered the trial of writer and 
human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others. This followed 
a communal conflict between supporters of the regime and its oppo-
nents led by the late Saro-Wiwa. The ‘Ogoni 9’ (some members of the 
faction in opposition to the government) were tried, convicted and 
executed in breach of due process. The ensuing protests in Ogoniland 
were met with a militarisation of the area. The aggrieved community 
had earlier forced Shell to shut down its operations in 1993.
As noted earlier, the Nigerian Constitution provides only for civil and 
political rights. Economic and social rights are variously interspersed 
and only provided for as part of the ‘fundamental objectives’ and ‘direc-
tive principles of state policy’. These objectives, stated in chapter II of 
the Constitution, include a duty on the state to protect and improve 
the environment and safeguard the water, air, forest, land and wild 
life of Nigeria, and to provide free education at all levels. State policies 
must ensure the provision of suitable and adequate shelter, food, a 
reasonable national minimum wage and pension rights.
Section 13 of the Constitution provides that it ‘shall be the duty and 
responsibility of all organs of government, and of all authorities and 
27 n 22 above. 
28 U Idemudia & UE Ite ‘Corporate-community relations in Nigeria’s oil industry: Chal-
lenges and imperatives’ (2006) 13 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management 194.
29 A Sengupta ‘The human right to development’ (2004) 32 Oxford Development Stud-
ies 179.
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persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform 
to, observe and apply the provisions of the chapter. But section 6(6)(b) 
of the Constitution overrides any attempt at judicial review or enforce-
ment of the rights that can be deduced from the section. It provides 
that the judicial powers conferred by the section shall not30
except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, extend to any issue as to 
whether any act or omission by any authority or person or as to whether any 
law or judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution.
The Nigerian Bill of Rights, contained in chapter IV of the Constitution, 
excludes economic, social and cultural rights. It has thus become a 
feature of Nigerian constitutional law that fundamental principles of 
state policy are non-justiciable. Like similar provisions in the Indian 
Constitution, they are exhortations of best practice. The Supreme 
Court re-affirmed this principle in Attorney-General of Ondo State v 
Attorney-General of the Federation and 35 Others (ICPC case).31 It held, 
among others, that the provisions of the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy can only be enforced through the 
promulgation of laws.32
The provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, it can be argued, do not 
fulfil the country’s obligations as a state party to CESCR. The country 
therefore falls into the category of state parties to CESCR who treat the 
Covenant with suspicion. These countries dichotomise human rights, 
according primacy to civil and political rights perceived as negative 
rights that do not require economic commitment by the government. 
Economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand, are perceived 
as positive rights with the need to commit financial resources, often 
leading to a redistribution of wealth.
Such a perception, as noted by Eide,33 is wrong. It has been posited 
that, in accordance with the provisions of sections 55 and 56 of the 
Charter of the United Nations,34 all nations are bound to observe eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights in the same way as civil and political 
rights.35 It is equally worth noting that the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)36 strengthens the argument for the 
non-divisibility of rights. Article 1 provides as follows
30 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
31 (2002) 6 SC Pt I 1 (179).
32 n 31 above, 69.
33 A Eide ‘Economic social and cultural rights’ in A Eide et al (eds) Economic, social and 
cultural rights (2001) 8.
34 Adopted at San Francisco 26 June 1945; entered into force 24 October 1945 1 UNTS 
xvi.
35 A Sengupta ‘Realising the right to development’ (2000) 31 Development and Change 
553 554.
36 Adopted at New York 16 December 1966; entered into force March 1976 GA Res 
2200A (XXI) UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171.
1 All peoples have the right of self-determination … and [they] freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2 All peoples may, for their own needs, freely dispose of their natural 
resources .… In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.
Section 162 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria attempts to address the 
need for special provisions for the Niger Delta. It provides a ‘derivation 
fund’ for oil-producing communities. Section 162(2) provides for the 
distribution of federal revenue in a manner that ensures that at least 
13% of the revenue derived from natural resources is allocated to the 
source of derivation.
The current administration, it appears, took advantage of the benefit 
of hindsight. It established, by legislation, the Niger Delta Develop-
ment Commission (NDDC) in 2000. The NDDC is an interventionist 
institution meant to address decades of social and infrastructural under-
development of the Niger Delta. Its primary aim is to ‘conceive plans 
and implement programmes for the sustainable development’ of the 
region.37 The creation of the NDDC appears to be ordinarily in confor-
mity with the provisions of article 2(1) of CESCR, which require state 
parties ‘to take steps … by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures’. The creation may be a step in the 
right direction, considering the dire needs of the Niger Delta. However, 
it is argued that the establishment of the NDDC falls short of the gov-
ernment’s obligations under CESCR.
All individuals resident in Nigeria, and not just the Niger Delta 
peoples, are entitled to the enjoyment of economic, social and cul-
tural rights. In particular, article 2(1) of CCPR provides that each state 
undertakes to ‘respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction’ the rights recognised in the Covenant, 
‘without distinction of any kind’. But no other part of Nigeria suffers 
from the same problems as those of the Niger Delta that required the 
establishment of the NDDC. The creation of the NDDC can be consid-
ered a positive measure to redress the imbalances in the Niger Delta 
identified above. International human rights recognise the principle of 
‘affirmative action’ with the general prohibition of non-discrimination. 
This position finds support in the decisions of the Human Rights Com-
mittee (HRC) in its General Comment No 18 in relation to affirmative 
action under CCPR,38 and its General Comment No 5 on CESCR.
Further, adequate provision is not made for the democratic represen-
tation of the local communities on the board of the NDDC. There is a 
need to accord them such rights under articles 1(1) and 21 of CESCR 
and African Charter respectively. Feelings of neglect go to the heart 
37 Sec 7 Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2000.
38 Nigeria submitted its ratification on 29 July 1997 and it entered into force in the 
country on 29 October 1993.
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of the matter.39 Community stakeholder representation is crucial to 
allow the representatives of the communities to prioritise their needs 
and allocate resources in the most efficient manner. In all events, it 
engenders trust for the organisation among the communities it is 
meant to serve. The present situation, where government appointees, 
though from various ethnic, corporate and other interest groups in the 
country, constitute the board of the NNDC and dictate its priorities, 
violates the rights of the communities to adequate representation.
Ironically, some of the foregoing ‘gains’ are being eroded by a num-
ber of actions taken by the federal government itself. One is a legal 
action, in which it sought and obtained a declaration which limits the 
proportion of accruable revenue to the oil-producing areas under the 
‘principle of derivation’. This followed the agitation by states of the 
Niger Delta for a larger share of federal funds through the principle.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Attorney-General of the Federation 
v Attorney-General of Abia State and 35 Others40 (Resource Control case) 
declared that the littoral states (including the Niger Delta) had no 
claims to resources within the continental shelf of the country. This 
was in line with the position of the federal government. The littoral 
states, on the other hand, had contended that there was no basis for 
a distinction between onshore and offshore natural resources.41 The 
communities of the Niger Delta regard this as another assault on their 
right to self-determination and control of their natural resources. How-
ever, the decision in the case was viewed as being unduly favourable to 
the federal (central) government. Eventually, the parties resorted to a 
political solution that somewhat assuaged the discontent of the littoral 
states.
The right of a people to control over their natural resources is widely 
couched and limited only by obligations to other sovereign states 
under international law. Article 21(1) of the African Charter provides 
as follows:
All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This 
right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case 
shall a people be deprived of it.
The seemingly absolute terms of article 21(1) are not free from prob-
lems. The subsection seems to strongly suggest that every group that 
is regarded as a ‘people’ has an unqualified right to control its natural 
resources. But who are the ‘people’ in a multi-ethnic state? Is it, as 
claimed by the Ogoni, an ethnic stock (‘nation’) in a region or geo-
graphical location in an independent state? Or the agglomeration of 
ethnic groups in a defined territory (country) with certain other features 
39 n 3 above, 18.
40 (No 2) [2002] 6 NWLR pt 764, 542.
41 For an analysis of the case, see KSA Ebeku ‘Nigerian Supreme Court and ownership 
of offshore oil’ (2003) 27 Natural Resources Forum 291.
recognised within an international comity of nations like the UN? In the 
SERAC case, the African Commission actually noted that the origin of 
this provision is traceable to colonial times, when the resources of Africa 
were exploited by foreigners, so ‘peoples’ in that context was in relation 
to the African states under colonisation. However, the African Commis-
sion noted as well that in post-colonialism, African governments now 
have obligations under this provision to protect their citizens.
The issue is further complicated by the seemingly divergent position 
of CESCR on the matter. It is possible to argue that CESCR accords some 
legitimacy to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Resource Control case. 
Support for this proposition can be obtained from a combined read-
ing of the provisions of articles 1 and 4 of CESCR. While articles 1(1) 
and (2) guarantee the right of peoples to self-determination and the 
disposition of their natural resources ‘for their own ends’, the state may 
‘subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law’. 
Such limitations are only required to be compatible with the nature 
of ‘these rights’ (ostensibly economic, social and cultural rights). The 
only other limitation to this power of state parties is that the law must 
be aimed at promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
The position of the federal government of Nigeria, sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court limiting the claim of the Niger Delta communities to 
the low water mark of the sea rather than the continental shelf, appears 
to satisfy this criterion. After all, the need exists to ensure that there are 
adequate resources for other parts of the country.
Further support for the foregoing view would also appear to come 
from the SERAC case. The African Commission, while recognising the 
rights of the Niger Delta communities to health and a clean environ-
ment, affirmed that
[u]ndoubtedly and admittedly, the government of Nigeria, through NNPC, 
has the right to produce oil, the income from which will be used to fulfil the 
economic and social rights of Nigerians.
The SERAC case thus maintains the balance between the rights of 
communities who own natural resources and others in a state party. 
Resources-rich communities are entitled to have the wealth derived 
from their natural endowments committed to their development. The 
decision goes further to affirm the right of other communities within 
the same state, which may not be similarly endowed to a share of the 
resource wealth.
The seemingly restrictive approach to the interpretation of the right 
to resource control by ‘peoples’ in this case may also be connected with 
the definition of ‘peoples’ in the African Charter. Unique as the use of 
the term may be by the regional human rights instrument, its use in 
different articles is rather an anomaly. To compound the situation, the 
African Charter defines the term nowhere. The African Commission is 
likely to place a restricted definition on the concept of ‘peoples’. This 
seems to be in accord with the history of the African human rights 
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system with its sensitivity to the issue of national sovereignty and the 
correlative principle of non-interference.
2.4 The attack on Odi town: Another round of human rights and 
due process violations
In November 1999, Odi town in the Niger Delta was burnt down 
by armed soldiers, ostensibly with the acquiescence of the Nigerian 
government. Several hundred people, including women and children, 
were massacred as they fled from their burning homes. This was a 
reprisal operation for the killing of 12 policemen by unruly youths, 
protesting the neglect of the community.42 Government is yet to bring 
any of the soldiers to book. Prosecution does not appear to be on the 
government’s agenda in this instance.43 This, despite the fact that it is 
possible to trace the troops involved.
The Odi incident has been characterised by the Nigerian govern-
ment as an isolated incident of the break-down of law and order. It is 
unlikely that the incident constitutes a ‘war’ situation and thus should 
not come under the purview of international criminal law. However, 
what cannot be contested is the fact that the rights of the victims 
were violated during the reprisal action. These include the right to life, 
health and property; all guaranteed by CCPR, CESCR and the African 
Charter, to which Nigeria is party. These treaties create binding obliga-
tions of respect, promotion, protection and fulfilment on all parties. In 
this case, it translates into the requirement for the proper investigation 
and remedy for victims particularly in view of the use of lethal force by 
government security agents.
In summary, developing countries, like all other states, are the tra-
ditional subjects of international law. They bear primary responsibility 
for their treaty obligations. Despite the theory regarding the indivis-
ibility of rights, the experience has been different in practice. Most 
states still do not make economic, social and cultural rights justiciable. 
A systematic erosion of the ability of developing countries to deliver on 
economic, social and cultural rights has accompanied the growth of 
MNCs. It is necessary that MNCs be made responsive to obligations to 
deliver on economic, social and cultural rights. For their part, the Niger 
Delta communities appear to have been driven to desperation, partly 
by the failure of the Nigerian government to heed the decision of the 
African Commission in the SERAC case.
42 I Okonta ‘The lingering crisis in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and suggestions for a peaceful 
resolution’ (2000) http://www.cdd.org.uk/resources/workingpapers/niger_delta_
eng.htm (accessed 31January 2008). 
43 Amnesty International (n 2 above) 2.
3 The SERAC case
This part of the article examines how the SERAC case sets the tone for 
the subsequent recognition of the economic and social rights of the 
oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta. I will argue that the SERAC 
decision constitutes a model for the recognition of economic, social 
and cultural rights. The challenge faced by such a position, however, 
is whether the rights affirmed by the decision have or can be brought 
home to the local communities of the Niger Delta.
The SERAC case was an attempt on behalf of the people of Ogoniland 
to assert and enforce their economic, social and cultural rights. The 
applicants (two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) based in 
Nigeria and the United States respectively) alleged that the oil explo-
ration activities of Shell had caused environmental degradation and 
health problems resulting from the contamination of the environment 
among the Ogoni people. They complained, among others, that the 
multi-national corporation had been in violation of applicable inter-
national law on environmental standards. This had resulted in various 
health complications for the people of the community.
Further, they claimed that the Nigerian military government that 
was in power at the time not only failed to monitor the activities of 
Shell, but also condoned and facilitated these breaches of international 
standards. Also of interest is the complaint that the Ogoni communities 
were neither consulted about, nor involved in, the decisions affect-
ing the development of Ogoniland. Rather, efforts at protesting such 
violations had been met with the destruction of their homes and the 
execution of Ogoni leaders.
The African Commission found for the applicants on all the alleged 
violations. It held that the rights to life, health as well as a good envi-
ronment guaranteed by the African Charter had been violated. In 
accepting and determining the application under section 56 of the 
African Charter, the African Commission set a precedent for the justicia-
bility of economic, social and cultural rights. This is relevant regionally 
and globally.
The African Commission stated that, being a party to the African 
Charter as well as CESCR, Nigeria has an obligation to respect, promote, 
protect and fulfil its treaty obligations. This pronouncement, extending 
the frontiers of protection to economic, social and cultural rights, is 
significant in the context of Nigeria, whose Bill of Rights excludes the 
protection of economic, social and cultural rights.
Further, the African Commission upheld the right of the Ogoni to 
freedom from exploitation guaranteed under article 21(5) of the Afri-
can Charter. It affirmed the duty of the Nigerian state to ‘eliminate all 
forms of economic exploitation, particularly that practised by inter-
national monopolies’ to enable the ‘peoples to fully benefit from the 
advantages derived from their natural resources’.
SERAC further stressed the position under international law that a 
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state can be held responsible for the acts of its agents, both public 
and private. It affirmed the obligations of states under international law 
to ensure, through executive and legislative action, that private actors 
such as MNCs refrain from violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights and other rights of every person within the Nigerian state. The 
only problem with this approach is that MNCs have deeper pockets 
than some poor states, so it would have been better to go directly after 
them for better redress for human rights victims.
Further, the African Commission stated that there was a violation of 
the right to representation. It stated that an adequate opportunity for 
representation in the ‘development decisions affecting the communi-
ties’ was an obligation placed on the government. This, it declared, 
was in accordance with the spirit of articles 16 and 24 of the African 
Charter.44
The decision further emphasised that collective and environmental 
rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights are ‘essential ele-
ments of human rights in Africa’. No other regional adjudicatory system 
puts the case more forcefully. However, the viability of pursuing the 
recognition and enforcement of these rights in the Nigerian domestic 
forum remained largely untested, until two recent decisions. Before 
examining these cases, it is important to stress a reservation regarding 
the SERAC and other decisions of the African Commission.
Admittedly, the advisory nature of the decisions of the African 
Commission has attracted strong criticism.45 What is the use of recom-
mendations that may be and are largely ignored in practice? A response 
to this reservation about the African Commission is that the Commis-
sion does articulate applicable human rights standards at a regional 
level. That makes it arguably easier for state parties to identify with its 
decisions and not consider them imperial impositions and opportunis-
tic neo-colonialism. The African Commission itself affirms this relativist 
approach, when it declared that46
[t]he uniqueness of the African situation and the special qualities of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights impose upon the African 
Commission an important task. International law and human rights must 
be responsive to African circumstances.
African countries, particularly the founding fathers of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), were decidedly wary of the international human 
rights regime. They very jealously guard their sovereignty against per-
ceived mechanisms for interference with their newly and sometimes 
44 SERAC case (n 13 above) para 53.
45 M Mutua ‘The African human rights system: A critical evaluation’ http://hdr.undp.
org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/mutua.pdf (accessed 31 January 2008). For 
a comprehensive exposition of the genesis of the African Charter, see F Ouguergouz 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human 
dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa (2004) 20-48.
46 SERAC case (n 13 above) para 68.
hard-won independence. This was largely responsible for their reluctance 
to warm up to the idea of human rights. Thus, there is scarce mention 
of human rights in the Charter of the OAU, unlike the UN Charter. How-
ever, the increased universal awareness and acceptability of the notions 
of human rights47 and its primacy in the contemporary state, has been 
reflected in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU).
The Preamble of the Constitutive Act, for instance, provides inter alia 
that the Heads of State and Government of the member states are ‘deter-
mined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights’. Further, 
article 3(h) of the Act states that one of the objectives of the AU shall 
be to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments. 
Provisions on the new focus on human rights are contained in article 4 
of the Act. It is clear that the African Commission has played a central 
role in actuating this turn-around.
In sum, SERAC is in line with the principle that rights are indivisible 
and that economic, social and cultural rights have the same force and 
justification as civil and political rights.48 Judicial developments in 
Nigeria after the SERAC case demonstrate the cardinal role the African 
Commission can play in developing human rights law and practice 
within the African context.
4 Vistas of hope
The ice surrounding the justiciability of economic, social and cultural 
rights in Nigeria has been broken by two cases decided in Nigerian 
courts. Like the SERAC case, they both challenge violations by MNCs of 
human rights in their operations in the Niger Delta. The pride of place 
for the pursuit and realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
before the Nigerian courts should perhaps go to the decision in Jonah 
Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company and 2 Others.49
The plaintiff brought the action on behalf of himself and the Iwhere-
kan community in Delta State. In the action, supported by three NGOs, 
Friends of the Earth (Nigeria), Climate Justice Programme (United 
Kingdom) and Environmental Rights Action, he claimed inter alia that 
the flaring of gas by the company within the Iwherekan community 
constituted a violation of the right to life and human dignity under 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, and articles 
4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
47 JK Mapulanga-Halston ‘Examining the justiciability of economic, social and cultural 
rights’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Human Rights 29.
48 Mapulanga-Halston (n 47 above).
49 Suit FHC/B/CS/53/05, Federal High Court of Nigeria, Benin (CV Nwokorie presiding 
judge) 14 November 2005 (order made 15 November 2005). See ‘Nigeria: Court 
stops gas flaring Shell appeals’ The Guardian 15 November 2005. 
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(Ratification and Enforcement) Act referred to above. For its part, the 
first defendant denied it was flaring gas in the Iwherekan community. It 
further argued that in all events, gas flaring was authorised by section 
3 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act and section 1 of the Associated 
Gas Re-Injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations, 1984.
In its judgment, the court declared that gas flaring is dangerous to the 
health of individuals and deleterious to the environment and that its failure 
to carry out an environmental impact assessment was illegal. Further, it 
held that the actions of the MNC in flaring gas were illegal and a violation 
of the constitutionally guaranteed, fundamental rights to life and human 
dignity as contained in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Constitution, as 
well as articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter. In upholding his claim, 
the Federal High Court ordered Shell to stop gas flaring. An important 
aspect of the decision is the Court’s voiding of sections of the Associated 
Gas Re-Injection Act and Regulations relied upon by the first defendant for 
being inconsistent with the applicants’ constitutional rights.50
In the second case, Ijaw Aborigines of Bayelsa State v Shell,51 a group 
of Ijaw from Bayelsa State instituted an action against Shell before the 
Federal High Court sitting in Port Harcourt. The plaintiffs sought an 
order of the court to enforce the payment of the sum of US$ 1,5 billion 
awarded in damages for pollution, made to the oil-producing com-
munities in the state by the Nigerian legislature after a public hearing 
by both parties before the National Assembly.
In its judgment of 24 February 2006, the Court held that Shell was 
bound to pay the sum which had been awarded by a resolution of 
the National Assembly. The Court stated that the resolution arose from 
a consensual attendance at the committee hearings of the National 
Assembly. Shell’s lawyers had argued unsuccessfully that the Joint 
Committee of the National Assembly lacked the power to compel the 
company to pay. Shell has, however, appealed the decision.52
50 The full text of the decision and enrolled order of the court respectively are avail-
able at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/gasflares/2005Nov14 
(accessed 10 February 2008). However, see the case of Barr Ikechukwu Opkara & 
4 Others (for themselves and as representing Rumuekpe, Eremah, Akala-Olu and 
Idamah communities of Rivers State) v Shell & 5 Others, Suit FHC/PH/CS/518/05, 
Federal High Court of Nigeria, Port-Harcourt (unreported, judgment delivered on 
29 September 2006). In the latter case, the court upheld the objection that under 
Nigerian law, human rights were personal and a representative action could not be 
maintained for its enforcement, specifically rejecting the precedent set in Gbemre. 
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/gasflares/22092006 (accessed 
10 February 2008). The decision has been appealed by the plaintiffs. 
51 Unreported case, judgment delivered by Justice Okechukwu Okeke, Federal High 
Court Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria on 24 February 2006.
52 BBC News ‘Shell told to pay Nigeria’s Ijaw’ 24 February 2006 http://news.bbc.
co.uk/-/1/hi/world/africa/4746874.stm (accessed 10 September 2006) and Rhys 
Blakely and Agencies ‘$1.5bn Shell Nigeria fine upheld’ http://business.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/business/market/ africa/articles/34579.ece (accessed 6 January 2007).
The significance and potential ramifications of the Federal High 
Court’s decision were not lost on observers of international law. It was 
voted as the ‘international law case of the month’ when it was deliv-
ered.53 Although the fulcrum of the case is the disputed implementation 
of what can best be described as an arbitral award, it is significant that 
the award itself constitutes formal recognition of the right to a clean, 
pollution-free environment, an important subset of economic, social 
and cultural rights.
The case provides a test case for the otherwise conservative Nigerian 
appellate judiciary to pronounce on the justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights beyond the narrow confines of whether the 
National Assembly, a legislative body, had the jurisdiction to make an 
award against Shell and also compel the MNC to pay. Specifically, the 
appellate courts had the challenge of developing the jurisprudence 
on the right to a pollution-free environment, sustainable development 
and damages for infractions of those rights. It is particularly significant 
that the African Charter has been domesticated as municipal legislation 
and should be considered by the appellate courts in this case. The case 
affords an opportunity for the courts to go beyond the consideration of 
the non-justiciable economic, social and cultural rights provisions in the 
Nigerian Constitution. Recourse should rather be had to the country’s 
international human rights obligations. The jurisprudence articulated 
in the SERAC case is quite relevant as an authority on these issues.
The Court, in coming to this decision, established a link among the 
rights to life, health and a clean environment. The Court finds support 
and a precedent in the SERAC case, though explicit mention does not 
appear to have been made of it. The African Commission made the 
significant pronouncement in the SERAC case that ‘pollution and envi-
ronmental degradation to a level humanly unacceptable’ amounted to 
a violation of the right to life of the Ogoni society as a whole.54 As in 
the Ijaw Aborigines case above, Shell immediately appealed the judg-
ment, but committed itself to a gradual phasing out of the obnoxious 
practice. An important feature of the judgment in Gbemre is that it links 
the right to life, popularly conceived of as a ‘civil’ right, with the right 
to a good environment, a ‘social’ right. In that way, the Court lends 
itself to the progressive conception of the indivisibility of all human 
rights. The implementation of these rights is problematic everywhere. 
It is instructive that the United States has not ratified CESCR. Ironically, 
it played an important role in articulating the normative framework for 
the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the UN Charter, 
53 R Alford ‘Case of the month: Shell v Ijaw Aborigines of Bayelsa State (Opinio Juris)’ 
http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/2006/02/case-of-month-shell-v-ijaw-aborigines.
html (accessed 10 February 2008).
54 SERAC case (n 13 above) 11-12. 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) and 
CESCR.55
It is expected that the appellate courts in Nigeria will seize on the 
gauntlet provided by Ijaw Aborigines and Gbemre to tow the line of the 
Supreme Court of India and entrench economic, social and cultural 
rights as justiciable rights in Nigeria. India, like Nigeria and many other 
developing countries, also has non-justiciable provisions in respect of 
economic, social and cultural rights. However, the Court has utilised 
its interpretative powers to extend the frontiers of enforceable rights in 
the country. Take the example of the right to life guaranteed and justi-
ciable under the Indian and Nigerian Constitutions. The Indian courts 
have consistently held that good health is cardinal to the enjoyment of 
the right to life.56 Thus, the right to health is linked to the right to life. 
In today’s globalised world, there is an urgent need for international 
law to proceed to extend its reach to major players in the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights, the ever-expanding MNCs.
5 Multi-national corporations and international 
human rights law
One of the central features of globalisation is the immense financial clout 
of MNCs. The phenomenon is a direct result of the democratisation of 
the global economic space championed by neo-liberal economics.57 
The flagrant neglect of economic, social and cultural rights by MNCs is 
somewhat of an irony. The disproportionate growth of MNCs in recent 
times stems from economic democracy. MNCs ought to be, even if 
only from the moral point of view, in the vanguard of human rights 
protection given its inextricable tie to democracy.
MNCs constitute some of, if not the principal actors in this new eco-
nomic equation.58 The new international economic order, promoted 
by the Bretton Woods institutions, has led to MNCs accumulating so 
many resources that they have become mega-actors on the interna-
tional economic, social and political scene. In more than a few cases, 
the presence of MNCs ‘has often removed decision making from the 
55 Eide et al (n 33 above). See also JS Gibson Dictionary of international human rights 
law (1996) 135-136 and Sengupta (n 29 above) 554.
56 See eg Paramand Katra v Union of India [1989] AIR 1989 SC 2039: 1990 Cvi LJ 671 
and Bandua Mukti Morcha v Union of India [1984] AIR 1984 SC 802. See also the High 
Court decision in Mahendra Pratap Singh v State of Orissa [1997] AIR 37. 
57 D Aguirre ‘MNCs and the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights’ (2004) 
35 California Western International Law Journal 53 53. 
58 K Nowrot ‘New approaches to the international legal personality of MNCs: Towards 
a rebuttable presumption of normative responsibilities’ http://www.esil-sedi.eu/
english/pdf/Nowrot.pdf (accessed 10 September 2006).
national sphere and state control’.59 The immense influence of MNCs, 
Bengoa declares, has resulted in ‘a clear loss of sovereignty on the part 
of the state and a greater globalisation of the decisions affecting the 
world’s population’.60 General Motors, a MNC, has ‘a larger economy 
than all but seven nations’.61
Bengoa’s view, considered in relation to developing countries, is that 
MNCs, particularly in the extractive industry, wield immense power in 
many developing countries, including Nigeria. The privileged position 
of MNCs as key players on the national and international scene ought 
to go with some responsibility.62
While MNCs are typically driven by the capitalist economic philoso-
phy of profit maximisation, it must also be conceded that the primary 
responsibility in international human rights law lies with states.63 This 
is because, essentially, human rights are a ‘compact between govern-
ments and individuals’.64 However, there is a progressive expansion of 
the reach of international law. Relevant private actors are now con-
ferred with duties under international law. Individuals whose actions 
contravene international criminal law are held directly accountable. A 
definitive manifestation of this is the creation of the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The posi-
tion finds further support in the creation of the International Criminal 
Court at The Hague for the trial of war crimes, crimes against human-
ity and genocide based on individual responsibility. Ratner has noted 
that international law can and should provide for a theory of corporate 
responsibility.65 The ‘privity theory’, it is proposed, is a viable option.
5.1 Multi-national corporations and the privity theory
MNCs, with their supranational reach, currently exert increasing 
control over the lives of people everywhere. United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics show that their 
59 J Bengoa Existence and recognition of minorities Commission on Human Rights Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on 
Minorities (6th session, 22-26 May 2000) 9.
60 n 59 above, 10.
61 Aguirre (n 57 above) 54.
62 C Backer ‘Multi-national corporations, transnational law: The United Nations norms 
on the responsibilities of transnational corporations as a harbinger of corporate 
responsibility in international law’ (2005) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 287 
highlights the growing scholarly debate on the issue in recent times. The article also 
comprehensively discusses the implications of the Norms on the regulatory relation-
ship between states, MNCs and international institutions.
63 Aguirre (n 57 above).
64 K Bennoune ‘Towards a human rights approach to armed conflict’ (2004) 11 Univer-
sity of California Davis Journal International Law and Policy 171 180.
65 SR Ratner ‘Corporation and human rights: A theory of legal responsibility’ (2001-02) 
111 Yale University Law Journal 443 449 
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growth has out-paced total world output.66 But that growth, despite 
its profound impact on the majority of the world’s population, has 
been accompanied by a decidedly low level of corporate responsibility. 
The situation has attracted considerable opposition to their activities.67 
Their power in relation to local communities in developing countries, 
where they have some of their largest operations, is awesome. As men-
tioned earlier, it is a fact that the resources of MNCs often go beyond 
that of the countries in which they operate.68 This reality creates an 
imperative for imposing direct obligations on them as relevant actors 
in the field of human rights.
The dominance of MNCs over economic and social policy dictates 
that they are made subject to the international human rights regime.69 
It must, however, be noted that some international law experts still 
question the validity of making private actors like MNCs the subject of 
international law.70 Others assert that it is plainly unworkable.71 How-
ever, there are many on the oppposite side of the divide advocating 
the propriety of extending the jurisdiction of the international human 
rights regime to MNCs.72
Arguably, the whole construct of human rights law is essentially aimed 
at securing the dignity of the individual from the wide-reaching powers 
wielded by the state. In other words, human rights law is engaged to 
protect the susceptibilities of the ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’ (individual) 
from the ‘strong’ and ‘invincible’ (state).73 The foregoing construct 
is dictated by the historical origin of contemporary human rights law 
dating back to World War II. In contemporary times, MNCs, though 
non-governmental, private entities, often conduct their business in a 
manner that intervenes in the relationship between the state and the 
individual. This intervention of MNCs is such that they bestraddle and 
actually overwhelm the latter. The very fact of ‘affective intervention’ 
justifies regulation of MNCs. At the least, such regulation should ensure 
the fulfilment of the obligations of the state to the individual.
A theory for conferring direct responsibility on MNCs under interna-
tional human rights law, which does not appear to have been clearly 
66 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002: TNCs and export competitiveness, Geneva, 
United Nations. 
67 M Koenig-Archibugi ‘Transnational corporations and public accountability’ (2004) 
39 Government and Opposition 234 235.
68 J Nolan ‘Human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations: Developing 
uniform standards’ (paper presented at the ANZIL Conference 18-20 June 2004, 
Canberra, ACT) (on file with author). 
69 Aguirre (n 57 above) 54-55.
70 Nowrot (n 58 above) 4. 
71 Ratner (n 65 above).
72 See eg Ratner (n 65 above); TF Maassarani et al ‘Extracting corporate responsibility: 
Towards a human rights impact assessment’ (2007) 40 Cornell International Law 
Journal 135.
73 Nolan (n 68 above) 3.
articulated, is the ‘privity theory’.74 This follows on the ‘weak’ versus 
‘strong’ paradigm. The basis of the state is the wilful submission of the 
individual of his rights and freedoms to the state in a ‘social contract’. 
Thus, the state exists as an expression of the agglomeration of individu-
als’ ‘sovereignties’.
It can be posited that the social contract between the individual and 
the state dictates that concessions (‘sub-contracts’ in contract theory) 
made by the latter operate to bind the privy (‘sub-contractor’) to the 
head contract to the extent of the expected impact of such areas of 
operation. In that way, licencees and concessionaires (such as MNCs) 
can be made to take on some of the obligations of their principal (the 
state) and become bound to fulfil them based on the doctrine of privity 
of contract. They could then become substantially bound to perform 
some of the important ‘terms’ of the contract between state and soci-
ety. Thus, MNCs, by virtue of the privity theory, will be required to 
observe some of the treaty obligations of the country.
It may be argued in some quarters that this proposition contradicts 
the law of treaties for seeking to create obligations for third parties 
without their consent. An alternative argument could then be can-
vassed that, under international law, states have an obligation not to 
allow their territory to be used to violate the rights of others; a principle 
well recognised under international environmental law.75
The position that responsibility for the realisation of international 
human rights lies primarily with the state does not obviate state licen-
cees such as MNCs. Rather, it strengthens the position that consensual 
participants in state craft are bound by the same obligations as the 
government. In a way, they are ‘extensions’ of the government in that 
they operate in spheres implicitly reserved for government under the 
social contract theory. But they are ‘extensions’ that exercise undue 
weight over the primary structure, almost to the point of subduing the 
former.
Critics of a legal framework that seeks to extend the liability of MNCs 
for economic, social and cultural rights insist that states as sovereigns 
have the responsibility to ensure the realisation of the rights of their 
citizens. While it is conceded that normative sovereignty lies with the 
state, it is now generally recognised that there is a radical shift in the 
74 See E Palmer ‘Multi-national corporations and the social contract’ (2001) 31 Journal 
of Business Ethics 245 for an extensive discussion of the fundamentals of the ‘con-
tractarian’ theory. He argues that ‘reason requires that the activities of enterprises 
accord with standards of environmental and governmental sustainability in addition 
to consortium, national law and international agreements’.
75 M Zurn ‘Global governance and legitimacy problems’ (2004) 39 Government and 
Opposition 260 268: ‘International regimes for overcoming global environmental 
problems are typical examples here. The ultimate addressees of regulations issued 
by international institutions are largely societal actors. While the states act as inter-
mediaries between the international institutions and the addressees, it is ultimately 
societal actors such as the consumers and businesses who have to alter their behav-
iour in order, say, to reduce CO2 or CFC emissions.’ 
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reach of state control. Although states have retained legal authority 
to protect their economies through numerous economic and political 
measures, the reality in the contemporary period is that the continued 
retention of those formal legal powers does not guarantee the attain-
ment of state policy objectives. Rather, in order to ensure the welfare of 
their citizens, states have had to ‘work with other powerful agencies’ 
and are now ‘obliged to share power’. The exercise of state power is 
now in the normative and, perhaps more so, in the political context, 
channelled through a ‘fractured sovereignty’.76 Perhaps nowhere is the 
effect of the paradigm shift in the cognitive limitations of state power 
over economic policies felt more than the (in)ability of developing 
countries to control the operation of MNCs due to the latter’s awesome 
resources.
Existing legal positions that insist on exclusive state responsibility for 
the realisation of human rights are derived from the classical philosophi-
cal narrative in which the state possessed absolute sovereignty. Current 
realities have moved well beyond this traditional view. The develop-
ment of connective technology, the conduct of globalised trading and 
economic relations, and the operation of international regulatory bod-
ies, among other factors, have continued to seriously erode the power 
of states, particularly developing ones, to retain absolute command of 
their territories.77 In view of the challenges posed by globalisation to 
the hitherto pre-eminent position of the state as the dominant player 
in economic and political affairs,78 there is a compelling need to reas-
sess the state-centric focus on realising economic, social and cultural 
rights in particular, and the welfare needs of citizens within a territory 
in general. Again, the peculiar developmental needs of local commu-
nities in developing countries (with decidedly weaker governmental 
structures), challenged by ever-expanding socio-economic globalisa-
tion dynamics, strongly recommend the adoption of a more inclusive 
and arguably pragmatic approach.
MNCs, like states, are bound to observe the obligations engen-
dered by the voluntary actions of the state. An analogous example is 
the principal–agent relationship. In that relationship, the obligations 
of the principal bind the agent. Conversely, the actions of the agent 
in pursuance of his agency bind the principal. In this instance, the 
principal is the state with its obligations under international human 
rights as the guarantor of individual rights. MNCs constitute the state’s 
concessionaires.
The case for regulation of MNCs and ensuring that international 
human rights law binds them is strengthened by the reality of the dis-
proportionate swing in their growth. The ‘opportunity cost’ for their 
76 M Loughlin Sword & scales: An examination of the relationship between law and poli-
tics (2000) 145-147.
77 Held (n 12 above). 
78 Loughlin (n 76 above) 140-144.
growth is the requirement for less state control of the economic sphere, 
which negatively impacts the delivery of economic, social and cultural 
rights.79 Neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes imposed by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) require states to minimise gov-
ernment role in policy formulation and control of the economy. This 
erosion of state sovereignty appears designed to, or at least works in 
favour of, MNCs.
The case for a ‘privity theory’ to hold MNCs responsible for the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights is further invigorated 
by the recognition that ‘transnationalised production challenges the 
standard model of public accountability of corporations through gov-
ernmental action and supervision’. This has led to the identification 
of accountability gaps between MNCs and their hosts, particularly in 
weak states. The primary source of accountability, the government, 
all but abdicates that responsibility due to internal (some of which 
are structural deriving basically from underdevelopment) or external 
factors.80
According to Zurn, the external or rather extraneous element impli-
cated is reflexive denationalisation.81 Itself a product of an embedded 
liberalism, it has resulted in ‘a process in which boundaries of social 
transactions increasingly transcend national boundaries’ and, conse-
quently, ‘challenged the capacity of national policies to bring about 
desired social outcomes’. Specifically, the ability of the state to effec-
tively intervene in the national socio-economic scene and to effect 
social welfare programmes in the interest of its nationals is severely 
handicapped by the ‘rapid increase in direct investments and highly 
sensitive financial markets’.82 The negative effects of the continu-
ally expanding global economic activities of MNCs are worst felt in 
developing countries. Thus, recourse to an externalised normative 
framework for facilitating the realisation of economic, social and cul-
tural rights of the largely underprivileged communities in developing 
countries ought to be considered a viable option.
In sum, then, it can be asserted that the encroachment of MNCs 
into developing economies impede the delivery of economic, social 
and cultural rights in those largely weak states. Such rights are thereby 
neither diminished nor dissolved. They usually recede into abeyance 
to the detriment of residents/citizens of those countries. It can be 
contended that the vacuum created by the receding institutions of the 
state in favour of MNCs transfers at least some responsibility for the 
promotion, protection and fulfilment of the economic, social and cul-
tural rights (and other rights for that matter) on the latter. That space 
79 Aguirre (n 57 above) 54-5.
80 Koenig-Archibugi (n 67 above) 238-245.
81 Zurn (n 75 above) 262.
82 Zurn (n 75 above) 265-266. 
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must be regulated under an imperative framework rather than on a 
voluntary-compliance basis.
6 International complicity?
For too long, the violation of the economic, social and cultural rights 
of local communities in developing countries has continued with the 
complacency of the international community. It may not be wrong to 
contend that there is complicity on the part of the international com-
munity on this issue. No doubt measures have been taken and initiatives 
introduced at the international level to hold MNCs responsible for 
economic, social and cultural rights. However, it would be contended 
below that these measures and initiatives have been weak and platitu-
dinous. What is required is affirmative and enforceable action.
The UN Global Compact on MNCs (UN Global Compact), initiated in 
1999 by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, is representative of 
such measures and initiatives. The drawback in its effectiveness is a reli-
ance on voluntary compliance, for which it has been rightly criticised.83 
The UN Global Compact cannot be expected to substantially facilitate 
the resolution of the current debacle in the Niger Delta or the problems 
of other communities caught between the might of MNCs and inept 
governments, as it lacks the aspiration to monitor the standards it so 
eloquently advocates.84
The same can be said about the UN Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
regard to Human Rights (UN Norms),85 despite its description as the 
most ambitious attempt at defining the corporate obligations of MNCs 
with regard to human rights. The Preamble to the UN Norms sets out 
an extensive list of human rights instruments, including those that deal 
with civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights which MNCs 
have an obligation to respect. Article 10 provides that, in the conduct 
of their operations, Transnational Corporations and other business 
enterprises ‘shall recognise and respect applicable norms of interna-
tional law, national laws and regulations, the public interest …’ Article 
12 further elaborates that they
shall respect economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political 
rights and contribute to their realisation, in particular the rights to develop-
ment, adequate food and drinking water, the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health, adequate housing, privacy, education, freedom 
83 C Hillemanns ‘UN norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regards to human rights’ (2003) 4 German Law Jour-
nal 1055.
84 However, see G Kell ‘The global compact: Selected experiences and reflections’ 
(2005) 59 Journal of Business Ethics 69 71-73 for the view that the UN cannot achieve 
a monitory/enforcement model and that such model is in any case undesirable.
85 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev 2 (2003).
of thought, conscience, and religion and freedom of opinion and expres-
sion, and shall refrain from actions which obstruct or impede the realisation 
of those rights.
These provisions are laudable for their comprehensiveness. Neverthe-
less, absent a monitoring and enforcement mechanism, they hardly 
advance the rights of MNCs’ host communities. The UN Norms (and 
similar instruments) remain astute theoretical postulations on ‘best 
practices’, rather than mechanisms for realising its elegantly crafted 
provisions.
The current array of initiatives at the international and regional levels 
would not transcend the level of platitudes if they continue to be based 
on voluntary subscription and moral adjurations. The realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights will likely affect the maximisation 
of profits, the ‘bottom-line’ of commercial enterprise. The formulation 
of the laudable principles around a non-enforceable and sanction-less 
framework does little to advance the rights of the weak and poor host 
communities. Tripathi, while discussing the regulation of MNCs in con-
flict zones, has argued that86
a company is not obliged to honour commitments it makes in any voluntary 
mechanism. Voluntary tools, therefore, are necessary but not sufficient to 
change a company’s behaviour in a zone of conflict. This is equally appli-
cable to the context of realising the economic, social and cultural rights of 
MNCs’ host communities.
The ‘soft law’ approach may be commendable for its attempt at 
inclusiveness and fostering voluntary subscription by MNCs. Koenig-
Archibugi, while arguing in support of the approach, observed that the 
voluntary commitment by MNCs to accountability provides informa-
tion to consumers, investors and other stakeholders (the last group 
presumably includes indigent host communities) and greatly assists 
them in making informed choices.87 The approach, he notes, is cur-
rently the favoured over enforceable mechanisms.88
In the context of European Community (EC) law, ‘soft law’ is best 
regarded as ‘rules of conduct’ or ‘commitment’ without binding legal 
force, but not without legal effect altogether.89 The common expec-
tation is that they can form the basis of customary international law 
or binding treaties.90 This characterisation of the status of soft law is 
generally applicable in international law.91 As non-treaty law, soft law is 
86 S Tripathi ‘International regulation of multi-national corporations’ (2005) 33 Oxford 
Development Studies 117 122.
87 Koenig-Archibugi (n 67 above) 246.
88 Koenig-Archibugi (n 67 above) 258.
89 L Senden ‘Soft law, self-regulation and co-regulation in European law: Where do 
they meet?’ (2005) 9 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1 27 http://www.ejcl.
org/91/art91-3.PDF (accessed 8 February 2008).
90 J Rehman International human rights law: A practical approach (2003).
91 P Malanczuk Akerhurst’s a modern introduction to international law (1997) 54-55. 
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not recognised as creating legal obligations. At best, it is regarded as a 
different regime of ‘law’ which falls outside of the principles of treaty 
law under international law.92
Two distinctive objections can be raised against the ‘soft law’ 
approach as advocated by Koenig-Archibugi. First is the assumption 
that all consumers and stakeholders have a capacity to constructively 
assess the information provided under such voluntary mechanisms. 
This may well be the case in developed countries, where basic educa-
tion can be taken for granted. However, it is a fact that inadequate 
education and, sometimes, a complete absence of basic education 
characterise underdeveloped countries. They are thus deprived of 
such access and consequently lose any benefits this may hold. The 
second objection derives from the assumption that consumers and 
stakeholders are socio-economically empowered to make any choice at 
all. This again is simply not the reality in underdeveloped or develop-
ing countries. Choices presuppose some level of empowerment, an 
asset rarely within the reach of low income-earning and less educated 
communities.
However, the voluntary mechanisms approach is probably more fun-
damentally flawed in its basic assumption that neo-liberal capitalism 
(the impetus for MNCs’ operations) subscribes to some high notions 
of morality. Why should it be assumed that MNCs will be interested 
in respecting, protecting, promoting and fulfilling the obligations of 
their host states to the obvious detriment of their profits? Such an 
assumption is hardly based on past or recent experience. Take the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines 
for the Operation of MNCs as an example. Its existence of over 30 years 
has not reversed the fact that MNCs from state parties constitute some 
of the worst violators of the human rights of host communities.93
The ‘lethargic response’94 of the international community to rein 
in MNCs and ensure the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights constitutes an abdication of its obligation under international 
human rights law. A number of international human rights law instru-
ments oblige UN member states to ensure the realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights by states and private actors. The Preamble 
of the Universal Declaration, while proclaiming it a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and nations, imposes a duty on ‘every 
individual and every organ of society to secure their effective recog-
nition and observance, both among member states and among the 
peoples of territories under their control’. Articles 22 to 27 of the Uni-
versal Declaration provide for economic, social and cultural rights. This 
92 H Hillgenberg ‘A fresh look at soft law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International 
Law 499.
93 OECD Watch 1 April 2003 http://www.germanwatch.org/tw/kw-inl01.pdf (accessed 
4 April 2006).
94 Aguirre (n 57 above) 57. 
clause in the Preamble, read together with articles 22 to 27, obliges the 
international community to go beyond imposing a duty on MNCs to 
respect the economic, social and cultural rights of local communities, 
as would appear to be the intent of the UN Norms. The Universal Dec-
laration provisions further require definitive measures to ensure their 
implementation and enforceability. This may be better actualised by 
replacing the norms with an enforceable treaty.
Further, and perhaps of greater significance, are the implications of 
articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter. Article 55 stipulates that the UN 
shall promote higher standards of living, full employment and con-
ditions of economic development. The UN is also obliged to ensure 
universal respect for human rights and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all. Article 56 emphasises the imperative 
nature of this duty, affirming that all members pledge their commit-
ment to take joint and separate action to ensure the achievement of the 
purposes set out in article 55.
In light of the provisions of articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, 
developed countries in particular have an obligation to ensure the 
regulation of MNCs. This is particularly so in view of the fact that they 
invariably are the ‘home’ states of the MNCs. Thus, MNCs, even as cor-
porate individuals, are their ‘citizens’. They are obliged at the national 
level to regulate the conduct of MNCs’ of their business, both within 
their territories and, arguably, internationally.
The foregoing proposition on extra-territorial regulation of MNCs 
is not alien to international law. Under international criminal law, for 
instance, nationals of a country can be tried in their home countries 
for offences committed abroad. The existence of this principle can be 
extended to international human rights law to scrutinise and regulate 
the activities of MNCs by developed home states. Such regulation 
is particularly germane now that MNCs are not easily amenable to 
regulation and control by developing countries keen on attracting or 
retaining them.
According to a pragmatic view of the current situation, genuine and 
concerted international action is required to combat the enormous 
reach of MNCs. Aguirre has noted that ‘the MNC has transcended 
national legal systems and ignored the feeble international system to 
make the imposition of human rights [on them] nearly impossible’.95 
But regulated they must be, as neglect can threaten global peace.
Developing countries, faced with the dilemma of de-emphasising 
economic, social and cultural rights to gain on competitiveness or close 
regulation of MNCs and lose out on Direct Foreign Investments (DFI), 
usually settle for the former. The apprehension that MNCs may move 
their operations elsewhere to obtain the benefits of fewer regulatory 
95 Aguirre (n 57 above) 56.
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burdens, is a potent one for developing countries at least.96 They are 
constrained by the ‘race to the bottom’97 to avoid adequate regulation 
of MNCs.
Considering their awesome resources, regulation of MNCs cannot 
be achieved without the co-operation of their ‘home’ countries. They 
hold the key to effective and compulsory regulation of MNCs consider-
ing their advantaged status. They benefit immensely from the profits 
of MNCs in the form of taxes and profit repatriation. They owe more 
than a moral obligation to ensure the delivery of economic, social and 
cultural rights by their ‘proxies’, MNCs. Their co-operation in achieving 
this laudable objective is required under the UN Charter and other legal 
instruments that constitute the very foundations of international law.
7 Conclusion
In many developing countries, economic, social and cultural rights 
are still non-justiciable. The role of NGO advocacy to challenge the 
neglect and violations of these rights cannot be over-emphasised. 
This is obvious from the decision in the SERAC case and the Nigerian 
cases examined in the article. Exploring supra-national adjudicatory 
mechanisms holds some promise. A wide gap existing between states’ 
formal commitment to international human rights instruments and the 
effective implementation of the obligations thus created, giving much 
cause for concern.98
Here, the inauguration of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights is important. An institution with more than recommendatory 
powers is arguably the appropriate mechanism for reigning in the cur-
rently immense, largely unchecked, power of MNCs with regard to their 
human rights obligations focused on in this discourse. Considering their 
multi-national nature, an international court, such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), with supra-national composition and jurisdic-
tion, may be even more effective. Thus, the composition, material and 
human resources of such an adjudicatory institution will be important 
to secure and retain the international respect and confidence required 
to meet the challenges of the global violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights by players with globalised resources.
The laws of standing before the Court, like those of the ICC, should 
similarly be liberal. It should provide for individual, group and third 
state or other interested party complaints alongside state-compliant 
96 Ratner (n 65 above) 463.
97 S Chesterman ‘Oil and water: regulating the behaviour of multi-national corpora-
tions through law’ (2004) 36 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Policy 308.
98 F Viljoen & L Louw ‘The status of the findings of the African Commission: From 
global persuasion to moral obligation’ (2004) 48 Journal of African Law 1 18.
procedures. The current state of the non-justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights in many state jurisdictions (especially in 
developing countries where the violations are most acute), coupled 
with the weakness or apparent lack of political will to ameliorate the 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly com-
mend this approach on standing to institute proceedings. However, 
like the position on jurisdiction of the ICC, it is further suggested that 
the rules of complementarity which allow for priority to be accorded to 
adjudication of cases within the state courts, where this is available or 
the parties are willing to approach the courts, should be incorporated 
into an enabling statute for such a court.
It is worth noting that Shell, like other MNCs, recognises the need 
to obtain and maintain a cordial relationship with the communities 
in the Niger Delta in which it operates. What is in dispute is the way 
to secure and maintain that valuable relationship. It is certainly not 
by maintaining a culture of denial. A resort to satisfying rent-seeking 
individuals and groups provides a decidedly short-lived reprieve. What 
is required is a proactive approach which centres on the recognition of 
the company’s obligations under international human rights law.
None of the parties to the conflict can reasonably expect to achieve 
a meaningful solution to the current debacle with their current stance. 
All concerned — the Nigerian government, the MNCs, the local com-
munities and the international community — have to revise their current 
strategies. There is a need to embrace the opportunity offered by the 
broad framework of international human rights with defined rights and 
responsibilities for all sides. The repression or violence and all sorts of 
criminality can only exacerbate the issues. This unfortunately is still the 
current situation; the backlash resonates in today’s global village.
It is important that the international community creates an enforce-
able treaty with an independent enforcement mechanism which can 
employ mandatory sanctions against MNCs. This accords with existing 
international law instruments such as the Universal Declaration and the 
UN Charter, which require concerted efforts for the universal entrench-
ment of human rights for all. It is no longer acceptable to maintain, as 
Nolan asserts, that ‘international law generally, and human rights law 
in particular, is still undergoing the conceptual and structural evolu-
tion required to address their accountability’.99 That process has gone 
on too long already. The existing soft laws can be transformed into 
enforceable mechanisms to rein in MNCs into the treaty framework. 
Such an approach holds the promise of pouring oil on the troubled 
waters of the Niger Delta.
99 Nolan (n 68 above) 3.
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